First, we demonstrate how unregulated price setting in mobile telecommunications may lead to monopolization, even when networks are highly substitutable. Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules, including (i ) mandatory interconnection, (ii ) reciprocal access prices and (iii ) a ban on price discrimination of calls to other networks may restore competition. This regulation requires neither demand data nor information about call costs.
Introduction
The European mobile telecommunications sector is currently under dual regulation. 1 Various structural regulations increase competition between mobile networks, by reducing di¤erentiation and consumer switching costs.
Extensive coverage obligations make the networks overlap geographically.
Mandatory interconnection make it possible to make calls between networks.
Number-portability allow consumers who want to switch networks to retain their phone number. Remaining network di¤erentiation results mainly from tari¤ constructions and the creation of consumer switching costs, which can also be reduced by regulatory intervention.
At the same time, the sector is still under price regulation. The fees charged for terminating calls from one network to another must typically We analyze whether further reductions of network di¤erentiation and switching costs would be enough to create a competitive environment allowing the price regulations to be removed. In case competition would still be imperfect, we like to know if there are additional structural remedies that may be added to restore competition.
Limits to Competition First, we demonstrate why and how unregulated price setting may lead to monopolization even when networks are highly substitutable. Entry is deterred by imposing three margin squeezes. First, the access price charged by the monopolist for termination is so high in relation to the price the monopolist charges for calls inside its own network (on-net) that it is impossible for an entrant to compete on termination of calls in the monopolist's network. Second, the monopolist sets a price for calls to any entrant (o¤-net) which is so low that the entrant cannot even pro…t from termination of calls in its own network. Third, the monopolist pays so little for call termination in the entrant's network that the entrant earns no access revenues. To successfully monopolize the market when networks are close substitutes, a monopolist must squeeze the entrants in all three markets.
The risk of monopolization hinges crucially, however, on asymmetric bargaining power between the networks, or a mechanism for the monopolist to share its pro…ts with an entrant. A prudent regulator will probably ask for additional tools to reduce the danger of monopolization .
A Simple Regulation Solves the Problem Second, we demonstrate that a menu of structural rules is su¢ cient to restore competition when networks are perfect substitutes. The menu include (i) mandatory interconnection; (ii) reciprocal access prices and (iii) a ban on price discrimination between on-net calls and o¤-net calls. Policies (i) and (iii) intensify call price competition by eliminating network externalities. Policy (ii) ensures that one …rm cannot push the competitor out of the market by underpricing access.
The policies are informationally undemanding: no information is required about demand or the costs of completing calls. They are thus easy to imple-ment and should also be transparent to the industry, thereby reducing the often substantial costs of regulation.
Mandatory interconnection and reciprocal access prices are standard elements in the regulator's toolbox. A ban on call price discrimination is novel, but consistent with e.g. EU regulations. In Estonia, for instance, the incumbent is disallowed to price discriminate between on-net and o¤-net prices of …xed calls (ERG, 2007) .
Finally, it is well-known that an equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. stable call prices, may fail to exist in telecom markets. We consider the problem of non-existence as real, not as an artefact of the model. We assume that regulators prefer stable prices. We will demonstrate that the policy sketched above guarantees the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium. Other policies (discussed below) do not.
Other Common Policies may Fail
Finally, we also analyze the properties of a number of common regulatory policies. A simple prohibition of margin squeezes inside one's own network may be counter-productive. Implementing such a policy may lead to a softening of competition by establishing a credible ‡oor on on-net prices instead of the intended ceiling on access prices.
A ban on margin squeezes on termination of calls in the entrant's network, would break the incumbent´s monopoly power, but would require information about the cost of calls in addition to being ine¢ cient: calls would be priced above marginal cost.
Requiring a reciprocal access price above the marginal termination cost will induce competitive prices even without the additional call price regulation. However, the e¢ ciency of this policy may be limited by arbitrage.
If the access price happens to be too high in relation to the competitive price, each network could open a subscription in the competitor's network and pro…t from making an unbounded number of o¤-net calls to one's own network. Competition would be non-viable. In the presence of arbitrage, the informational requirements of this policy are substantial.
Contributions We extend the analysis of network competition to the case of strong network externalities by assuming a low (zero) degree of network di¤erentiation. Most papers in the literature have followed in the footstep of Armstrong (1998) illegal. The present paper makes no such restrictions, but presents a rationale for why these three policies might form the basis of a sound regulatory policy and, therefore, a rational for the modelling strategy.
Most of the literature concerned with market performance considers the problem of collusive access prices. Instead, Calzada and Valletti (2008) study how reciprocal access prices can be used to deter entry when networks are poor substitutes. The present paper complements Calzada and Valletti (2008) by showing that entry deterrence can be achieved even when networks are close substitutes, provided the access prices are asymmetric.
We show that networks may have an incentive not to interconnect because subsequent cut-throat competition will eradicate all pro…ts. Carter and Wright (1999) also study the incentives to connect, but conclude that the problem is anti-competitive agreements, rather than reaching an agree-ment. Their conclusion which is based on a model of di¤erentiated networks.
This shows that the degree of network di¤erentiation is likely to be important for the networks'incentives to connect.
Discussion of the Assumptions The market for telecommunications
clearly is a lot more complicated than the model we consider. We have ignored …xed telephony as we expect mobile telephony to become the dominating medium for voice telephony. Mobile penetration exceeds 100% in many developed countries, the UK and Sweden being two examples. Mobile telephony is superior to …xed telephony in many dimensions, not only regarding mobility, but also in terms of available services, such as text messaging and multimedia access. With mobile prices converging to …xed prices, more and more subscribers can be expected to abandon …xed telephony altogether.
Twenty-six out of thirty OECD countries have three or more national operators. Moreover, switching between networks is costly due to lead times.
Our assumptions of duopoly and perfect network substitutability seem at odds with reality, but are not critical. We show in the Appendix that monopoly call prices can be sustained in duopoly even in a standard Hotelling model of network di¤erentiation, provided networks are not too di¤erenti-ated. Obviously, a deregulated market can be monopolized independently of the number of networks, provided all challengers accept the same unfavorable asymmetric call termination conditions.
In a companion paper (Stennek and Tangerås, 2008) , we extend the analysis to cover the case of many networks and imperfect network substitutability.
It turns out that the market can be monopolized even if the networks are required to charge reciprocal access prices and are forbidden to create network externalities by means of di¤erentiating call prices or making the networks incompatible. The problem now is collusion, rather than entry deterrence.
Market concentration has two countervailing e¤ects on network competition.
A standard competitive e¤ect working through the elasticity of demand pulls in favour of low prices. But a cost e¤ect goes in the other direction. A larger fraction of each network's calls are terminated o¤-net when there are more networks. If o¤-net calls are subjected to an access price mark-up, the e¤ec-tive marginal call cost goes up when there are more networks. If the access price is high enough, the cost e¤ect is so strong as to fully neutralize the competitive e¤ect, leaving equilibrium prices unchanged at the monopoly level.
To restore competition, we add a cost-independent cap on access prices to the regulatory menu (i)-(iii). For a su¢ ciently tight cap, call prices fall as more networks enter the market and converge to marginal cost as network di¤erentiation goes to zero.
Typically, telecom operators have large …xed costs. Fixed costs would only serve to exacerbate the problem of monopolization under a laissez-faire policy. However, the networks are unable to recover their …xed costs under competitive prices. Therefore, some lump-sum transfers might be required to secure budget balance. Information about …xed costs may be more readily available than information about marginal call costs. Moreover, it is not socially optimal to strive for "perfect competition", for example by removing all network di¤erentiation. We leave the issue of optimal network di¤erentiation for future research.
We make the assumption that networks use linear prices, but show elsewhere (available upon request) that our main results do not hinge upon this assumption. The industry may be monopolized also under two-part call tari¤s, and any equilibrium by necessity is competitive under the menu of regulatory policies (i)-(iii). We believe that an analysis with linear prices is interesting in its own right. Standard models of nonlinear network competition seem unable to capture interesting economic trade-o¤s and important ine¢ ciencies. In the standard models there are no consumer losses due to distortions. All calls are priced at marginal cost. Marginal costs are too low since the networks tend to agree on access prices below the marginal cost of termination (Gans and King, 2001; Calzada and Valletti, 2008) . In addition to producing counter-factual predictions -o¤-net prices are below on-net prices -call prices are too low from a welfare viewpoint. Most regulators are concerned with call prices being too high. In reality, operators o¤er menus of two-part tari¤s, presumably to price discriminate between heterogeneous consumers. Under non-linear prices, operators would distort call prices to extract rent from subscribers, precisely as in a model without two-part tari¤s.
Thus, a model with homogeneous consumers which abstracts from two-part tari¤s captures the same ine¢ ciencies and trade-o¤s one would expect to materialize in a more elaborate (and complicated) model with two-part tari¤s and heterogeneous consumers (see Dessein, 2003 for an early exploration).
Model
Consider a mobile telecom market with 2 operators/networks. The interaction is described as a game with four stages. First, the operators negotiate access prices. Subsequently, the operators unilaterally and simultaneously set the prices for calls inside their network, so-called on-net calls, and calls outside the network, so-called o¤-net calls. Third, the consumers choose a subscription based on the call prices, and …nally decide how many calls to make. There is a continuum of consumers of unit measure, each of whom buys one subscription, i.e. the market is fully covered.
Call Demand In stage four, all consumers have taken a subscription in one of the networks, and they all make calls on the basis of the call prices.
Every subscriber to network i makes q ii calls to every subscriber in network i at the on-net price p ii per call and q ij calls to every subscriber in the other network j, at the o¤-net price p ij per call. No subscriber attaches any value to incoming calls and therefore receives utility s i U (q ii )+(1 s i )U (q ij )+y, where
is the customer base of operator i, U ( ) is a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function, and y is a numeraire good. Utility maximization subject to the budget constraint s i q ii p ii + (1 
where 
The proof of the above and all subsequent lemmas and propositions are contained in the Appendix.
In the three …rst cases, the prices are such that there are no network e¤ects: one customer's preferred network does not depend on the choices of other customers. All customers have the same preferences; thus, they all end up with the same operator. An exception is when the two operators o¤er the same bene…ts, in which case the operators share the market equally. In the fourth case, the prices induce positive network externalities, and the networks become strategic complements: all customers prefer to belong to the network with the largest customer base. In stable equilibrium, all customers belong to the same network, but which one is undetermined. In the …nal case, the prices induce negative network externalities whereby the networks become strategic substitutes. The larger is the customer base, the less attractive is the network. In this case, the equilibrium customer bases balance the prices to make the two networks equally attractive for customers.
Network Pro…t In stage two, network i sets (non-negative) call prices p i to maximize its pro…t
where c t is the marginal cost of call termination, c o is the marginal cost of call origination, c = c t + c o is the total marginal cost of a completed call, a i is access price paid by network i for every call terminated in the competitor's network and a j is the compensation i receives for every outside call it terminates in the own network. The term in brackets is the pro…t per subscriber. The …rst term is the pro…t from on-net calls, the second term is the pro…t from outgoing o¤-net calls, and the third term is the pro…t on incoming o¤-net calls.
To guarantee that the monopoly pro…t function D (p) (p c) has a unique interior maximum, p m > c, we assume that (p c) (p) =p is increasing in p c and that
is the price elasticity of call demand. Common demand functions such as constant elasticity an linear demand ful…ll these assumptions. Denote by
We consider Nash equilibria in pure strategy call prices, henceforth simply referred to as equilibria. Equilibria are indicated by an asterisk, so that
is a corresponding equilibrium customer base, and i = i (p i ) denotes the equilibrium pro…t of network i.
In the …rst stage, the networks negotiate the pair (a 1 ,a 2 ) of access prices.
As is standard in the literature, the access prices are set to maximize industry pro…t 1 + 2 . To guarantee that a network will not have an incentive to make phony calls to the other network, the marginal cost of o¤-net calls must be non-negative, i.e. a i c o .
Equilibrium with positive network externalities Certain call prices
give rise to positive network externalities in the customers'choice of networks.
One network attracting all customers is then a stable equilibrium outcome, but so is the other network attracting all customers. This happens if
Positive network externalities are unlikely to arise in equilibrium, however. In such a case, one operator could always change its call price to get the same pro…t with certainty as it would at most obtain under positive network externalities.
Lemma 2 Assume that for every price con…guration which gives rise to positive network externalities, at least one operator assigns a positive subjective probability to both stable customer base con…gurations S i (p) 2 f0; 1g. Then, there exists no equilibrium with positive network externalities.
On the basis of Lemma 2 we henceforth disregard equilibria with positive network externalities.
Welfare Welfare is the sum of indirect consumer utility and …rm pro…t:
The social optimum is achieved by setting all prices equal to marginal cost in this model. The access prices have only an indirect bearing on welfare via the e¤ect on call prices and …rm pro…tability. The scope of regulation is to induce a competitive equilibrium, that is, an equilibrium in which all calls are made at marginal cost c.
3 Call Prices, Access Prices, Interconnection
Laissez-faire
Assume that operators are free to negotiate any access price between themselves, and that call prices are unregulated. A laissez-faire policy may lead to monopoly pricing:
, there exists an equilibrium. In any equilibrium, network i corners the market (S i = 1), charges the monopoly price on on-net calls (p ii = p m ) and sets a price on o¤-net calls below the marginal cost of on-net calls (p ij c).
The proposition states that full monopolization is the unique equilibrium outcome. Access prices block competition even when networks are perfect substitutes and there are no …xed costs.
Since network i monopolizes the market, i will sometimes be referred to as the incumbent. Network j, then, is the entrant. The incumbent's pricing policy takes the form of a three so-called margin squeezes. First, the access price for termination in the incumbent's network is so high in relation to the incumbent's on-net price (a j > p ii c o ) that it is impossible for an entrant to pro…tably compete on termination of calls in the incumbent's network.
Second, the incumbent sets an o¤-net call price that is so low that the entrant cannot even pro…t from termination of calls in its own network (p ij c).
Third, the incumbent's compensation to the competitor for call termination is so low that the entrant earns no access revenues (a i = c t ). To successfully monopolize the market when the two networks are close substitutes, a …rm must squeeze the competitor in all three markets. For example, a failure to squeeze the competitor in the competitor's own network (p ij > c), would allow the competitor ample leeway to pro…tably monopolize the market for
Importantly, this suggests an extension of the margin squeeze criterion to include more markets than just termination in the squeezer's own network, the common policy today.
Full monopolization necessarily involves one of the operators cornering the market. It is impossible for the two operators to share the market and reach industry monopoly pro…ts when the degree of network substitutabil-ity is very high. 3 We see three plausible reasons why such an asymmetric equilibrium may be a reasonable prediction. First, one of the networks may have substantially more bargaining power, e.g. resulting from an incumency advantage, starting out with all customers in the own network (cf. de Bijl and Peitz, 2002) . Second, if both operators are international carriers with a home and a foreign market, they could agree on a geographical market segmentation allowing each operator to monopolize its home market. Third, pro…ts can be distributed by means of joint ownership whereby each operator holds a 50% stake in the competitor.
We conclude there is a scope for a prudent regulator to intervene. Given the importance of margin squeezes, we consider …rst regulation of call prices. If, in laissez-faire, the monopolist is unable to raise the access price suf…ciently (i.e. up to a), the threat of entry might push down the equilibrium on-net price below the monopoly level, to say p ii < p m = a j + c o . With a ban on margin squeezes, the price would never fall below the ‡oor a j + c o = p m .
Regulation of Call Prices
In other words, a ban on margin squeezes may act as a commitment device, ensuring a high on-net price.
Prohibition of Predatory Prices in the Other Network Assume now
that i is required to set p ij > c. This policy may be described as a prohibition of predatory pricing. Such a policy would be as demanding as the previous one in terms on information about marginal cost, but would have the impact that no operator could establish monopoly power; see the argument above.
Three aspects are noteworthy. First, the threshold is the competitor's marginal cost c = c o + c t and not c o + a i , which is operator i's marginal cost of sending calls to j. Second, the policy might lead to disturbances of call prices in the sense that a pure strategy equilibrium in call prices may then fail to exist. Moreover, the policy cannot possibly lead to the …rst-best outcome as it requires that o¤-net calls be priced above marginal cost c. Hence, better policies than this could exist.
Prohibition of Call Price Discrimination Both policies above are burdened with informational problems. A softer type of regulation than direct price regulation would be to prohibit price-discrimination between on-and o¤-net calls, i.e. requiring p ii = p ij = p i . This policy requires no information at all about cost data. Moreover:
Proposition 3 If call price discrimination is prohibited (p ii = p ij = p i ), the competitive outcome (p 1 = p 2 = c) is the only possible equilibrium.
Uniform pricing forces …rms into Bertrand competition with one another for customers, which necessarily forces prices down to marginal cost. It would appear that uniform pricing solves the monopoly problem. However, in the proposed equilibrium, operator i's pro…t is given by
Unless operators charge reciprocal access prices, one operator will su¤er a loss at marginal cost pricing. There is no reason to presume that the operators would actually agree on reciprocal access charges, as all pro…ts would subsequently be competed away. If interconnection is mandatory, e¢ cient bargaining suggests that the operators prefer to induce exit, although there is the issue of splitting the surplus from such an agreement. In case a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist, prices are by de…nition stochastic, and the outcome cannot be e¢ cient.
As we have seen, regulation of call prices is subject to a number problems including informational burdens, allocative ine¢ ciency and a potentially destabilizing e¤ect on call prices. Perhaps for this reason, mobile call prices are mostly left unregulated across Europe. Therefore, it seems fruitful to consider alternative policies for dealing with failures in the markets for electronic communications. Next, we consider regulation of access prices.
Regulation of Access Prices
Cost-based Regulation of Access Prices Since bans on margin squeezes may induce a ‡oor on call prices rather than a ceiling on access prices, one may wish to consider policies that serve to reduce access prices. The standard regulatory solution is direct regulation:
Proposition 4 If the operators are required to set access charges above termination cost (a i c t ) but below the "monopoly squeeze level,"(a j < p m c o )
no equilibrium exists which sustains monopoly pro…ts.
Regulation of access charges at least partly mitigates the monopolization problem. However, this policy is even more informationally demanding than call price regulation. Not only does the regulator need to have an assessment of marginal transmission costs, she also needs demand information to be able to infer the monopoly price. Second, even if this information were available, there is no guarantee that an equilibrium in call prices actually exists. Hence, access price regulation may destabilize the call price market when networks are highly substitutable.
Reciprocal Access Prices Above Marginal Termination Cost A policy which is less informationally demanding than the previous one is:
Proposition 5 If the operators are required to set reciprocal access charges above termination cost (a 1 = a 2 = a c t ) there exists an equilibrium, and every equilibrium is competitive.
Proposition 5 states that call prices will be competed all the way down to marginal cost, provided the reciprocal access price is not too low. 4 At face value, the informational requirements of the policy appear to be weak.
Reciprocity does not require demand data. Also, one can ensure that the lower bound is met by setting a generous access price. In reality, the feasible access price may be bounded above by an arbitrage condition. Suppose that o¤-net calls are priced at c, but access is priced at a c t > c. Proposition 6 Assume that the two operators set a reciprocal access price below the marginal cost of termination (a 1 = a 2 = a < c t ). Then, every operator with a positive market share has an equilibrium o¤-net price which is lower than the on-net price (p ij < p ii if S i > 0).
To eliminate any incentive to soften competition by underpricing access, the proposition suggests that access price regulation be combined with call price regulation. We now turn to an analysis of a combined regulation.
Combined Call Price and Access Price Regulation
As we have demonstrated above, call price or access price regulation alone seem incapable of achieving the competitive outcome. However, a combination of call price and access charge regulation is more promising.
Proposition 7 Assume that call price discrimination is prohibited (p ii = p ij = p i ) and that operators are forced to charge reciprocal access prices (a 1 = a 2 = a). For every access price a c o , the competitive outcome
A special case of the above is the much debated Bill-and-Keep regime (a 1 = a 2 = 0), which in combination with a ban on call-price discrimination would induce the competitive outcome with interconnected networks.
This policy requires neither demand nor cost data, when the networks are perfect substitutes as assumed here.
However, there is an additional problem. The result is derived under the implicit assumption that operators are interconnected. Without an interconnection agreement, there would be two incompatible networks in the market.
Under perfect network substitutability there would be two stable equilibria, each leading to monopolization by one of the networks. The network externalities are so strong that both equilibria coexist for any price con…guration satisfying p 11 < u 1 (0) and p 22 > u 1 (0). 5 In particular, monopoly call prices can be sustained in equilibrium. If the alternative is to sign an agreement and earn zero pro…ts, it may be in both operators best interest not to sign any interconnection agreement. Thus, regulatory intervention into the retail and access markets may have to be assisted by mandatory interconnection.
5 S i (p ) = 1 is a stable customer base for any price con…guration p where p ii < u 1 (0) and the two networks are disconnected. If a subscriber to network i expects a fraction s j to choose network j. Then, the bene…t s j u(p jj ) of subscribing to network j is lower than the bene…t (1 s j )u(p ii ) of subscribing to network i for s j su¢ ciently low, but positive.
Concluding Remarks
The Monopolization Problem A laissez-faire approach to network competition may lead to monopoly call prices, even if all di¤erentiation between networks would be removed. A network can sustain its monopoly power by using its access price to raise the rival's costs for terminating calls inside the own network while simultaneously setting predatory prices on calls terminated in the rival's network. Thus, there is a scope for regulatory intervention even in a market where network di¤erentiation is low.
The crucial condition for monopolization is the possibility of setting asymmetric access prices. In other respects the result is robust.
Absence of di¤erentiation is not crucial for the result. Monopoly call prices can be sustained in equilibrium even in a standard Hotelling model of network di¤erentiation such as the one considered by LRT, provided networks are not too di¤erentiated. This is shown in the proof of Proposition 1. In LRT, all equilibria break down when networks are su¢ ciently close substitutes, but this is because the networks are assumed to charge reciprocal access prices. There is no reason to presume that two networks would agree on symmetric access prices if the market could be monopolized under asymmetric access prices.
Absence of …xed costs is not crucial for the result. On the contrary. The higher are the investment costs, the less would one network have to squeeze the competitor(s) to preserve monopoly power.
Duopoly is not crucial for the result. Any number of competitors are blocked from gaining market power if they all accept same unfavorable call termination conditions. Absence of two-part tari¤s is not crucial either. With two-part tari¤s there are no welfare losses due to distortions since the monopolist prices calls at marginal cost. Instead, the subscription fee is used to transfer all surplus from consumers to the monopolist. Still, intervention is warranted if the social planner values consumer surplus higher than network pro…t. The calculations are available on request.
A Regulatory Solution A combination of informationally undemanding policies are shown su¢ cient to restore competition under perfect network substitutability: (i) interconnection is mandatory; (ii) access prices are reciprocal; (iii) price discrimination between calls inside one's network (on-net calls) and calls to competing networks (o¤-net calls) is illegal.
Moreover, all three ingredients are necessary to generate a competitive environment. Unless interconnection is mandatory, the …rms can create strong network externalities and thereby sustain monopoly on-net prices by making networks incompatible. With disconnected networks, access prices and o¤-net call prices do not matter for competition. If networks are allowed to di¤er-entiate their access prices, the network with the lowest access price is driven out of the market when networks are interconnected and call price discrimination prohibited. Thus, competition is non-viable. Finally, if the networks are interconnected and access prices are reciprocal, but call price discrimination is legal, the networks can soften competition by creating tari¤-mediated network externalities through a manipulation of the joint access price (see, e.g. Gans and King, 2001; Armstrong and Wright, 2008; Gabrielsen and Vagstad, 2008) .
Also the regulatory solution is robust in many dimensions. In a companion paper (Stennek and Tangerås, 2008) we analyze how the above menu of policies fare when networks are imperfect substitutes and there are more than two networks. If the regulator places an additional cap on all access prices -we call this package STR (structural) regulation -call prices will converge to marginal cost as network di¤erentiation goes to zero. Also, we …nd that a cap on access prices is necessary even when there are many networks and access prices are set in bilateral negotiations. Market concentration (the number of networks) has two countervailing e¤ects on competition. The price elasticity of subscription demand increases when there are more networks. This competition e¤ect pulls in favour of lower prices. However, a larger fraction of each network's calls are terminated o¤-net when there are more networks. If o¤-net calls are subjected to an access price mark-up, the e¤ective marginal call cost goes up. In a fully covered, symmetric market where the call pattern is balanced, the cost e¤ect fully neutralizes the competition e¤ect, leaving equilibrium prices unchanged. Hence, reduced market concentration is no guarantee of low prices.
In the presence of …xed costs, perfect competition is not necessarily the social optimum. Instead, the networks must be allowed enough market power to be able to recover their costs. Jeon and Hurkens (2008) show that an access price rule given by a i c o = 2(p i c) would implement Ramsey prices when the networks have a …xed cost for each subscription. However, under this rule the problem still remains how the networks should cover costs that are independent of the amount of calls and of the number of subscribers.
The STR (structural) regulation allows networks an operating pro…t which is declining as networks become closer substitutes. Consequently, there is an optimal degree of network substitutability under STR (structural) regulation at which the networks just break even. Optimal network di¤erentiation is an interesting issue for future research. 
Appendix Proof of Lemma 1
We do the proof case by case. First, assume that u (p jj ) u (p ij ) and that u (p ii ) u (p ji ), with at least one strict inequality. Note that
is strictly positive for all s i 2 (0; 1). Thus, S i 2 f0; 1g.
V (p j ; s j ) independently of the customer base s i . In this case the operators by assumption divide the market, i.e. S i = 1=2.
Fourth, consider the case with positive network externalities,
The S i = 1 equilibrium and S i = 0 equilibria are both stable because V (p i ; s i ) > V (p j ; s j ) even for positive, but small s j and V (p i ; s i ) < V (p j ; s j ) even for positive, but small s i . There exists a unique interior equilibrium given by b
, but this equilibrium is unstable since
is strictly positive (negative) for all " > (<) 0 and the equilibrium thus converges to one of the corner equilibria S i 2 f0; 1g for every tremble " 6 = 0.
Finally, consider the case with negative network externalities. There can be no corner equilibrium since
The only possibility left is the interior equilibrium given by the solution to V (p i ; S i ) = V (p j ; S j ):
.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume throughout the proof that there are positive network externalities in equilibrium; u (p 11 ) > u (p 21 ) and u (p 22 ) > u (p 12 ). Let i 2 (0; 1) be the subjective probability operator i assigns to cornering the market. First, it cannot be the case that p ii < c. In this case it would be strictly pro…table for i to deviate to p ii = p ji and p ij > p jj . The deviation would render i a unique market share S i = 0 and, consequently,
Second, it cannot be the case that p ii c and p ii 6 = p m . It would then be strictly pro…table for i to deviate to p ii 2 (p ii ; minfp m ; p ji g) and p ij = p jj in case p ii 2 [c; p m ) and to p ii 2 (p m ; p ii ) and p ij = p jj in case p ii > p m . In both cases would i corner the market with certainty and
Finally, it cannot be the case that p ii = p m and p ij > p jj .
It would be strictly pro…table for i to deviate to p ij = p jj , corner the market with certainty and
Proof of Proposition 1
We …rst prove existence, and then move on to showing that all possible equilibria imply monopolization by operator i.
Existence Proposition 1, stating that laissez-faire leads to monopolization for very asymmetric access prices is a key result and the rationale for intervention in the market. To demonstrate that the result does not hinge crucially upon the assumption of perfect network substitutability, we shall prove the monopolization result in a standard Hotelling model of imperfect network competition based on the seminal work by La¤ont, Rey and Tirole (1998a and b).
Assume that a continuum of consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, and two networks are located at either end of the interval, operator 1 at 0 and operator 2 at 1. The (virtual) transportation cost t 0 is a measure of horizontal di¤erentiation, with perfect substitutability at t = 0. The utility of subscribing to network i for a consumer located at a distance k i from operator i is
where is the direct utility of subscribing to a network and su¢ ciently large to guarantee that the market is fully covered. In interior equilibrium,
, which yields at most one interior customer base, given by
The interior equilibrium is stable if and only if u(
and any tremble " > (<) 0 pulls all subscribers towards operator i (j) if
We restrict attention to the set of stable customer bases.
The proof that monopolization is an equilibrium is a special case (t = 0)
of the following more general result:
Proposition 8 Let the customer bases be formed on the basis of the Hotelling model above. Assume that the networks are not too di¤erentiated, i.e. t < u(p m ). Let a i = c t and a j u 1 (u (p m ) t) c o . Then, the following price con…guration constitutes an equilibrium:
and p ji = a j +c o . The customer base is unique and stable and given by S i = 1.
Proof. We …rst show that it is a strictly dominating strategy for almost all subscribers to choose network i given p . The net bene…t
of choosing operator i over j for a consumer located at k i 2 [0; 1) is strictly positive no matter the expectation s i about i's market share. The strict
Next, we show that operator i has no incentive for deviating. S i = 1 and
All deviations are unpro…table since for all p i :
We …nally show that j cannot pro…t from gaining a positive market share, S j > 0. First, consider the possibility of deviating to a stable interior equilibrium, S j (p j ; p i ; t) 2 (0; 1) given by (3). By necessity,
and thus
S j (p j ; p i ; t) = 0 since the denominator of (3) is positive in any stable equilib-
would be non-positive. S j (p j ; p i ; t) implicitly de…nes p ji (p jj ) as a function of p jj . Any movements of p ji and p jj along the iso-market share curve
keep the market share of operator j constant. The slope of the iso-market share curve is dp ji dp jj
. Along the iso-market curve, pro…ts are a¤ected as follows:
Marginal pro…t is strictly negative for all p jj > c and p ji < a j + c o . Thus
and so a deviation by j to a stable equilibrium with S j (p j ; p i ; t) 2 (0; 1)
is unpro…table since j = 0. The …nal possibility is a deviation by j to monopoly. Note that S j (p j ; p i ; t) = 1 only if V (p j ; 1) t V (p i ; 0), which is equivalent to u(p jj ) u(0) + t. This is possible only if p jj = 0. But S j = 1 and p jj = 0 imply j = cD(0) < 0 = j , and a deviation to monopoly is not pro…table, either.
Monopolization
The proof that all possible equilibria imply monopolization by operator i, given the chosen access prices and given perfect network substitutability is collected in a series of seven claims. Claims 1 to 4 establish that S i = 1 in every equilibrium. Claim 5 shows that p ij c in every equilibrium with S i = 1. Claims 6 and 7 demonstrate that p ii = p m in every equilibrium with S i = 1. 
for all S i 2 (0; 1) and p ji > p m . This is inconsistent with i = m and j = 0. 
p ji p m < a j + c o and S j 2 (0; 1) can be equilibria because all cases would imply j < 0:
To complete the proof, we need to rule out the possibility that (p jj c)D(p jj ) = 0, p ji = p m = a j + c o and S j 2 (0; 1). In this case i can set p ii = p m , p ij < c corner the market and earn m . It cannot earn as much by letting j into the market since p jj 6 = p m , hence i + i < m and consequently i < m .
Claim 4 Assume that a j p m c o and a i c t . Then, p ji p m implies
Proof. Obviously, S j = 1 can be an equilibrium only if p jj c, otherwise j would run a de…cit in equilibrium. Moreover, p ji c in any equilibrium S j = 1. Otherwise, i can set p ii 2 (c; p ji ) and p ij < p jj , become the monopolist and earn pro…t (p ii c)D(p ii ) > 0, which is strictly preferred to having zero market share. Finally,
p ii to p m , retain monopoly power and obtain the higher monopoly rent m .
Hence, p ji c p jj p m in any equilibrium with S j = 1. Consider i's policy p ii > c p ji and p ij < p jj . In this case S i 2 (0; 1). Moreover,
Thus, it is strictly pro…table for i to lower p ij slightly below p jj and gain a positive market share.
Claim 5 S i = 1 implies p ij c.
Proof. First, of all S i = 1 implies p ii c. Otherwise i would run a strict loss.
Any combination p ii c and p ij > c allows j to charge a price p jj 2 (c; p ij ) and p ji < p ii , become the monopolist and earn
This, of course, is better than having no market share at all.
Claim 6 S i = 1 implies p ii p m .
Proof. If p ii > p m , i could lower p ii to p m , retain monopoly power and obtain the higher monopoly rent m .
Claim 7 Assume that a j a = c t + 2 (p
Then,
Proof. 
The …rst term in square brackets is strictly positive for all p ji < p m . The second term in square brackets is positive for all a j a and p ji < p m . Hence, i has an incentive to increase its price and sacri…ce its monopoly market share given a i c t , a j a, and p ji < p m .
Proof of Proposition 2
We know from Claims 1 to 4 in the proof of Proposition 1 that for a i = c t and 
The inequality follows from the fact that p ii > c, p ij < p ii , and (p c) (p)=p is increasing in p. Hence, for any (p ii ; p ij ) such that S i 2 (0; 1), we have
since p ij ! p jj as p ii ! p ji along the iso-market line. At the proposed
The term in square brackets is decreasing in a j , and since a j < a,
If p ji ! p m and p jj ! 0, the term on the right hand side of the inequality
Hence, there exists a p ji su¢ ciently close to and below p m and a p jj su¢ ciently close to, but above zero such that i prefers to hold on to his monopoly power at p ii = p ji < p m .
Proof of Proposition 3
We …rst demonstrate that p 1 = p 2 = p . There can be no equilibrium in
In equilibrium, S i = 0 and i = 0 
Proof of Proposition 4
For the industry to reach the monopoly pro…t, either one operator has the monopoly (S i = 1) and charges the monopoly price on on-net calls (p ii = p m ), or both operators have a positive market share (S i 2 (0; 1)) and charge the monopoly price on all products (p 11 = p 12 = p 21 = p 22 = p m ). In the last case, the operators divide the market and obtain half the monopoly pro…t
This cannot be an equilibrium. By lowering the o¤-net price below the monopoly price (p ij 2 (0; p m )), any single operator can corner the market and reap the entire monopoly rent. Assume therefore that p ii = p m and S i = 1. Consider j's alternative policy p ji 2 (a j + c o ; p m ) and p jj > c p ij . In this case S j 2 (0; 1) and
Thus p ii = p m and S i = 1 cannot be an equilibrium, either.
Proof of Proposition 5
The …rst claim proves the existence of a competitive equilibrium under the assumption that a 1 = a 2 c t .
Claim 8 Assume that a 1 = a 2 c t . Then, p 11 = p 21 = p 12 = p 22 = c is an equilibrium.
Proof. At the proposed equilibrium, i = 0. Neither a deviation to p ii < c nor to p ii = c and p ij 6 = c can be pro…table. In both cases S i 2 f0; 1g. As i = 0 when S i = 0 and i = (p ii c)D(p ii ) 0 when S i = 1, the deviation cannot be strictly pro…table. Any pro…table deviation must therefore be to p ii > c. In this case it cannot be strictly pro…table to also set p ij c, because then S i = 0 and i = 0. We …nally need to check the pro…tability of the deviation p ii > c > p ij . In this case S i 2 (0; 1) due to the negative network externalities. Consider the marginal e¤ect on pro…t of a movement among the iso-market-share curve p ij (p ii ), see (4):
because p ij < c, p ii > c and a i c t . Note that lim p ii !c p ij (p ii ) = c, and so
by reciprocity of the access price. Any deviation p ii > c > p ij is unpro…table, which completes the proof.
The …nal sequence of claims is used to prove that all possible equilibria are e¢ cient. We invoke Lemma 2 and rule out equilibria with positive network externalities. Claim 9 demonstrates that under reciprocal access prices a 1 = a 2 = a c t , all equilibria in which one operator corners the market necessarily are e¢ cient. Claim 10 proves that there is at most one equilibrium in which the two operators divide the market equally under reciprocal access prices a 1 = a 2 = a c t . This equilibrium is e¢ cient. Finally, we
show that there is no equilibrium with negative network externalities and reciprocal access prices a 1 = a 2 = a c t .
Claim 9 Let a 1 = a 2 = a c t . Then, S i = 1 implies p ii = c p ij .
Proof. Note …rst that S i = 1 implies p ii c p ij . Obviously, p ii c since p ii < c and S i = 1 imply i < 0. S i = 1 and p ij > c cannot simultaneously hold because j could then enter as a monopolist and earn a strictly positive pro…t by setting p jj 2 (c; p ij ) and p ji p ii . Suppose therefore that S i = 1, Finally, there can be no equilibrium with negative network externalities. From the above claim we observe that equilibrium prices are strictly positive. Thus, the …rst-order condition e 0 i (p ij ) = 0 must be satis…ed, which
